dc.contributor.author | Yalçın, Şehabettin | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-20T17:51:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-20T17:51:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1301-0875 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://app.trdizin.gov.tr//makale/TXpneE9ESXk | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12809/8810 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, Descartes' theory of self and self-knowledge is being examined. Descartes claims that self-knowledge has a special status, and is more certain that sensory knowledge,because while it is acquired directly through an intellectual intuition, sensory knowledge is mediated. The aim of Descartes' cogito argument is to show that self-knowledge is the most certain of all kinds of knowledge and, that because of this it is absolutely indubitable. However, as I try to show in this paper, Descartes makes unjustified deductions from the cogito argument such as that the thinking self is a simple, immortal substance. I argue that while the cogito argument proves that 'I as a subject' must exist, it does not give us any insight into the nature of this T. That is to say, the cogito argument does not show that this " I" is a simple, immortal, and thinking substance. | en_US |
dc.item-language.iso | tur | en_US |
dc.item-rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Felsefe | en_US |
dc.title | Descartes ve Özne Olarak Benlik | en_US |
dc.item-title.alternative | Descartes and Self as Subject | en_US |
dc.item-type | article | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | MÜ, Edebiyat Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü | en_US |
dc.contributor.institutionauthor | Yalçın, Şehabettin | |
dc.identifier.volume | 0 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 38 | en_US |
dc.identifier.startpage | 107 | en_US |
dc.identifier.endpage | 118 | en_US |
dc.relation.journal | Felsefe Dünyası | en_US |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Ulusal Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Eleman | en_US |