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dc.contributor.authorYalçın, Şehabettin
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-20T17:51:47Z
dc.date.available2020-11-20T17:51:47Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.issn1301-0875
dc.identifier.urihttps://app.trdizin.gov.tr//makale/TXpneE9ESXk
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12809/8810
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, Descartes' theory of self and self-knowledge is being examined. Descartes claims that self-knowledge has a special status, and is more certain that sensory knowledge,because while it is acquired directly through an intellectual intuition, sensory knowledge is mediated. The aim of Descartes' cogito argument is to show that self-knowledge is the most certain of all kinds of knowledge and, that because of this it is absolutely indubitable. However, as I try to show in this paper, Descartes makes unjustified deductions from the cogito argument such as that the thinking self is a simple, immortal substance. I argue that while the cogito argument proves that 'I as a subject' must exist, it does not give us any insight into the nature of this T. That is to say, the cogito argument does not show that this " I" is a simple, immortal, and thinking substance.en_US
dc.item-language.isoturen_US
dc.item-rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectFelsefeen_US
dc.titleDescartes ve Özne Olarak Benliken_US
dc.item-title.alternativeDescartes and Self as Subjecten_US
dc.item-typearticleen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMÜ, Edebiyat Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümüen_US
dc.contributor.institutionauthorYalçın, Şehabettin
dc.identifier.volume0en_US
dc.identifier.issue38en_US
dc.identifier.startpage107en_US
dc.identifier.endpage118en_US
dc.relation.journalFelsefe Dünyasıen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Ulusal Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanen_US


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